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INTRODUCTION 
The growing stalemate between social theories of religious decline and those of persistence has 
prompted researchers to explore alternative explanatory factors such as demography. In most 
instances, people get their religion (or non-religion) through birth, thus the link between religion 
and population change is important. In spite of growing interest in the demography of religious 
change, little research has been conducted in this area1.  This is particularly true of projection work. 
Like standard multivariate models based on retrospective data, projections allow us to use 
parameters from the past and present to arrive at a model which can generalize into the future. In 
addition, existing age structures enable demographic projections to offer a stronger degree of 
predictability than social, economic or political forecasts. Instead of a point prediction of the future, 
however, cohort-component models produce a set of scenarios centering on a median prediction. 
These scenarios serve as a heuristic device to advance conceptual understanding by allowing us to 
think through how demographic change affects the religious landscape in a particular case, namely 
Spain.  
Among the few studies that have undertaken multi-state projections of religion, the focus 
has been solely on affiliation (Barrett, Kurian, & Johnson, 2001; Johnson & Grim, 2008; PEW, 2011; 
Skirbekk, Goujon, & Kaufmann, 2010; Statistics Canada, 2005). This paper builds on this work by 
examining religious intensity in addition to denominational affiliation. Though this is not yet 
possible in many countries due to data limitations, it is an exciting new field which holds out the 
possibility that we may be able to specify what the religious landscape may look like in a country in 
a generation or two. In short, this is one of the first papers to offer a demographic projection of 
population groups distinguished not only by religion but by their levels of religiosity.  
 
                                                          
1
 Extant work generally focuses on the impact of religion on demography, i.e. Lehrer, 1996; Westoff & Frejka, 
2007. 
 3 
 
THE PLACE OF DEMOGRAPHY IN THEORIES OF RELIGION 
Why might we want to understand the compositional effects, in terms of religious intensity, of a 
given set of demographic and switching dynamics? Perhaps the most pressing answer concerns the 
debate over secularization. The sociology of religion has featured a longstanding debate between 
theorists of secularization (Bruce, 2002; Dobbelaere, 2000; Martin, [1978] 1993; Swatos & 
Christiano, 1999) and proponents of the supply-side or religious markets model (Grim & Finke, 
2007; Stark & Iannaccone, 1994), though there is a growing consensus that religious change is 
highly context-specific (Greeley, 2002; Hout & Greeley, 1987; Smith, 2008). One variant of 
secularization theory (Bruce, 2002) predicts a decline in the power of religious belief and practice. 
Secularization theorists generally argue that religiosity declines as countries achieve higher levels 
of development. Norris and Inglehart (2004) explain religious decline as a function of rising human 
development (principally as education and income), which allays individuals' fears of insecurity. 
Since insecurity is held to power religious belief, its disappearance allows secular alternatives to 
displace religion. Yet even secularization theory acknowledges that trends vary widely. Indeed, 
Norris and Inglehart acknowledge that patterns of religious observance map onto both culture 
zones such as Muslim or Protestant, and universalistic criteria such as income per capita. Naturally, 
particularist and universalist interpretations of religiosity data point in distinct theoretical 
directions. Acknowledging the role of particularism in producing wide cultural variation in patterns 
of religious change, Bruce (2002), for instance, restricts the application of his theory to the West. He 
argues that social differentiation – driven by both economic specialization and religious pluralism – 
undermines religion's relevance and truth claims. All told, when it comes to religious change, there 
is considerable variation between countries and regions. Modernity sometimes takes secular form, 
but at other times and in other places, it may inject religion with vigor (Davie, 2007). Others claim 
that we can find 'multiple modernities' even in Europe, where levels of religious change – in terms 
of attendance and belief – are highly variable between countries (Greeley, 2002).  
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 Finally, several authors argue that demography – notably religious fertility and immigration 
premiums over the nonreligious – may be as or more important than switching in explaining the 
future religious makeup of the West (Hout, 2003; Kaufmann, 2010; Kaufmann, Goujon, & Skirbekk, 
2011). The demographic approach should be conceived of as informing, but largely orthogonal to 
the secularization debate mentioned above. It affects the trajectory of religious change at the level 
of society, but not at the level of individuals. One could conceive of religious decline among 
individuals, as secularization theory might predict, even as society becomes more religious due to 
religious population growth. Alternatively, one might find that society is becoming less religious 
because a young nonreligious population is entering its childbearing years, even as more 
individuals switch into religion than leave it. Thus, demographic change affects the character of 
society – and in that sense is important for theory – but does not alter the sociological forces 
operating on individuals. A projection of a subset of the US population studies whether switching or 
fertility is more important in determining religious group population growth in the longer term 
(Scheitle, Kane, and Hook 2011). Their simulations suggest that both switching and fertility are 
crucial to growth, but groups that do not gain members through switching in the shorter term are 
doomed through switching.  
Two of the main contemporary sources of demographic change that implicate religion are fertility 
and migration. Mortality, which is important in several historical accounts of religion (i.e. (Stark, 
1996)) plays a lesser role today, especially in advanced democracies. Fertility, however, is almost 
always greater among those who practice their religion than among those without religious 
affiliation. 
RELIGIOSITY AND FERTILITY 
Differences in family size between religions are common, but this often has more to do with a 
group's position on the curve of demographic transition than with the intrinsic characteristics of 
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the religion itself. The decline of Catholic, and now Muslim, fertility provides evidence of this socio-
economic convergence effect relative to Protestants (Westoff & Frejka, 2007; Westoff & Jones, 
1979).  
 The intensity of religiosity (measured in terms of attendance at worship or self-reported 
belief) often matters more for fertility than religious affiliation (Finnas, 1991; Jampaklay, 2008; 
Philipov & Berghammer, 2007). Practicing members of religions tend have higher fertility 
regardless of religious affiliations, for example in France (Regnier-Loilier & Prioux, 2008) and in the 
US (Skirbekk, et al., 2010).  Religiosity, although interconnected with the socio-economic, cultural, 
and political spheres (Lehrer, 2004; McQuillan, 2004; Philipov & Berghammer, 2007), has been 
found to be a powerful determinant of family formation patterns, notably marriage, age at first birth 
and number of children. Deeply religious individuals often argue that their current family beliefs 
and behavior result mainly from their religion’s teachings, rather than being the outcome of other 
socio-economic traits (Borooah, 2004; McQuillan, 2004).  
 Differences in the relation between fertility and religious intensity between orthodox and 
nominal members of a faith will often exceed the differences between the median members of 
different faiths. This is most evident in Judaism, where the ultra-Orthodox typically have three or 
four times the fertility of liberal or secular Jews (Berman, 2000). Yet even in Christianity and Islam, 
fundamentalist groups typically have twice the fertility of theological liberals, with higher multiples 
being found in the most zealous religious groups such as the Old Order Amish or Quiverfull 
movements in Protestant Christianity (Joyce, 2009; Kaufmann, 2010). 
 Fertility patterns thereby reflect the ‘religious restructuring’ paradigm whereby differences 
in religious intensity within religions come to matter more than differences between faith tradition. 
This effect has been noted most clearly in the American context, where moral conservatives of all 
religious traditions – notably but not only Catholics and Protestants – have increasingly gravitated 
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toward the Republican Party while liberals of all faiths support the Democrats. The difference in 
presidential voting between 1960, when religious tradition was key, and 2004, when religious 
intensity trumped faith tradition, is stark (Guth, Kellstedt, Smidt, & Green, 2006; Wuthnow, 1989).  
 At the compositional level, changes in religious affiliation may understate the degree of 
religious change in a society because religious intensity goes unmeasured. Thus, although religious 
affiliation may apparently remain stable, beneath the surface great shifts in religious intensity may 
be occurring, one example being the growth in the proportion of the “belonging without believing” 
group (Marchisio & Pisati, 1999).   
 
THE SPANISH CASE 
Spain has some specificities that make the study of religion and religiosity particularly interesting. 
The country has shifted in just a few decades, through immigration and religious decline, from 
being almost exclusively Catholic to becoming religiously diverse. The Spanish religious landscape 
is still influenced by the Franco regime which invested Roman Catholicism with exclusive legal 
status. At the time of the Spanish transition to democracy after Franco’s death (1975), the number 
of non-Catholics was less than 1 percent (Solsten & Meditz, 1990). The return of democracy in Spain 
was accompanied by a rapid increase in religious decline among youth, and a rapid drop in fertility 
that witnessed a total fertility rate (TFR) fall from 2.8 in 1975 to 2.1 in 1981 and to 1.2 in 1998 
(Goujon & K.C., 2009). The third component influencing religious composition and intensity in 
Spain is migration. Since the mid-1970s Spain ceased serving as an emigration country and 
increasingly became a receiving country. It first served as a transit point for migrants heading to 
Northern countries (especially France and Germany) at the end of the 1980s. From the end of the 
1990s it became one of the most important destination countries in Europe, with newcomers 
arriving mainly from North Africa and South America. More recently, flows have broadened to 
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include non-traditional sources such as the rest of Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe. The post-2008 
economic crisis could, however, drastically reduce immigration, whether formally – through the 
enforcement of stricter migration policies – or informally – through a lessening of attraction of pull-
factors. 
 
METHOD 
The importance of religious projections lies in the degree to which they can inform us about 
the composition of populations in the future, given a set of demographic parameters such as fertility 
or migration, as well as sociological parameters for intergenerational transfers of religion and 
switching between religious groups.  
It is important to appreciate that most countries of the world do not collect census data on 
religion. Even among those which do, there is no information on religious intensity (i.e. attendance, 
theology). It is therefore challenging to compute fertility and migration by levels of religious 
intensity within a country. Adding to the complexity is the need to generate assumptions about the 
religious intensity of future immigrants in the absence of data on immigrant religiosity. Yet, despite 
such limitations, this form of modeling generates important theoretical insights which make the 
task worthwhile. Moreover, data from a large survey such as the Spanish module, as used here, 
when triangulated with other sources, yields a revealing picture. Especially by incorporating a 
range of scenarios, projections methodology offers insights that are conceptually and empirically 
rich. Although our approach involves a significant degree of uncertainty, we argue that projections 
of religious intensity offer important new insights which add to typical, retrospective approaches. 
However, imperfections in the data do exist, which is why we seek to do our utmost best with the 
data available, while being mindful of such limits when interpreting the results. 
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In this study, we undertake multistate population projections2 by religion and religiosity 
(religious intensity) for Spain for the period 2010-2050. First we estimate the base population for 
the year 2005 by age, sex, religion and religious intensity. We identify the size and composition of 
migration flows by denomination and religiosity. Differentials in childbearing patterns by religion 
and degree of religiosity are then calculated. Age- and sex-specific religious (denomination and 
religiosity) conversion rates are also taken into account. We further assume that children’s religion 
and religiosity is identical to that of their mother until age 15. This is in line with research 
suggesting a strong link between parental religious beliefs and the beliefs of their children (Axinn & 
Thornton, 1993; Barber, 2001; Glass, Bengtson, & Dunham, 1986; Kelley & De Graaf, 1997), 
following parental socialization, preferences for passing on their own faith and contextual 
influences such as the religiosity of the neighborhood parents choose to live in. In the absence of 
compelling evidence to the contrary, this makes most sense as a baseline assumption. 
The connection between mother and child, religion and birth, means that fertility 
differentials between religious groups based on denomination or intensity translate into larger or 
smaller numbers of offspring attached to each group. This therefore affects the religious (both 
denomination and intensity) composition of the next generation3.  
We assume that there are no mortality differentials by religion as there is not enough 
evidence to underpin and parameterize an assumption of the causal impact of religion on mortality. 
Although often a positive association between religiosity and mortality has been found in, it is 
uncertain to which extent health-related selection and sorting into religion can play a role. Survival 
differences by religion may largely attributable to cross-sectional and prospective differences in 
personality traits, social ties, health behaviors, and mental and physical health – and a potential 
                                                          
2
 Multistate projections is a demographic methodology which is used in projections of populations 
disaggregated by status – individual characteristics that can change over time – such as education attainment, 
marital status, or religion and level of religiosity (for more see: Philipov & Rodgers, 1981; Rodgers, 1995; 
Rogers, 1975).     
3 For a discussion, see Goujon, Skirbekk, & Fliegenschnee, 2007. 
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presence of publication biases indicates that results should be interpreted with caution 
(McCullough et al. 2009; Chida, Steptoe, and Powell 2009; Idler 2011). 
We estimate migration flows by age, sex, religious affiliation and level of religiosity. Several 
scenarios, based on combining different fertility and migration assumptions, are constructed to 
cover a plausible range of possible outcomes. 
The Spanish population, disaggregated by age, sex, religion, and degree of religiosity, is 
projected to 2050 based on assumptions contained in these scenarios. The results are then 
analyzed to determine the sensitivity of the projections to different fertility and migration 
assumptions.   
 
DEFINITION OF RELIGIOSITY 
Religiosity has been measured in surveys based on a range of different questions, including 
Religious Attendance, Religious Practice, and Self-Assessed Religiosity (see, e.g., (Billiet, 2003; 
Campbell 2005; Skirbekk, et al., 2010; Smith 1998). We focus mainly on the self-assessed religiosity 
measure because of our trans-religious approach - different religions emphasize different religious 
practices and activities (Kistler, 1995; Lotz, 1981). For instance, the doctrine of Sola Scriptura in 
Protestantism implies that Church attendance is not necessarily a requirement to be religiously 
devout, while for other groups, such as Catholics, church attendance is obligatory. When analyzing 
religious intensity between religions, the importance of religious attendance may also differ 
significantly, and comparing religious activities across religions may be more problematic than 
comparing religious traditions within one religious group.  
In effect, while many measures of religiosity are suitable for comparing religiosity within 
one religion, they may be less suited to assessing religiosity between them, as different religions 
accord different weight to the importance of attendance, ritual and other practices. We 
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acknowledge that our primary religiosity measure, self-assessed religiosity, also has clear 
shortcomings, as different population subgroups might interpret it through local rather than global 
lenses. However, our belief is that the problems of self-assessed religiosity can be smaller than of 
alternative measures for raising comparability across religions and religious traditions strengthens 
this choice. We use a dichotomous definition of religiosity, where individuals are grouped according 
to whether they view themselves as “low” or “high” religious. For the resident Spanish population, 
we base our estimates on responses to the European Social Survey questionnaire (ESS, 2012), 
which includes self-assessed religiosity. 
 
BASELINE ESTIMATES 
POPULATION STRUCTURE 
The structure of the Spanish population by age, sex, religious denomination, and intensity in 
2010 is estimated using information from various sources. We focus on four groups: Christians, 
(predominantly Roman Catholics), Muslims, Unaffiliated and Others. Data on religion affiliation are 
not available from the census (IRFR, 2008)4. Thus we use data from surveys and municipal 
registers. To estimate the share of the main religious groups by age and sex, we use microdata from 
the 2010 Barometro Autonomico II survey (CIS, 2010). Undertaken by the Centro de 
Investigaciones Sociologicas (CIS) the survey only covers three religious categories – Roman 
Catholics, Unaffiliated, and Others. The data indicates that Spain is comprised of 75.2% Catholics 
and 19% Unaffiliated. We distinguish Muslims and Other Christians5 from the category ‘Others’ 
using other sources of data using procedures explained below.  
                                                          
4
 According to the Spanish constitution no individual is obligated to answer questions regarding his or her 
religious beliefs. 
5 Religious group called “Protestants and Others” mostly consists of Protestants, Orthodox, and other 
Christian groups (e.g., Marginals, Independents).   
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 The substantial increase in the share of Muslims is a recent phenomenon driven mainly by 
immigration. We use official statistics on stock of migrants by age, sex and country of birth (from 
the Spanish National Statistical Institute, INE 2011) to estimate shares of religious groups that 
result mainly from relatively recent migration. For instance, the growth in the number of Muslims 
began in the early 1990s at which time the size of this group was estimated at just 2,350 people 
(Peach & Glebe, 1995).   
 In 2010 there were 6.9 million immigrants in Spain – around 15.2% of the total population 
(World Bank, 2011), with Moroccans forming the second largest single group (around 0.63 
million6). We acknowledge that migration has in several cases been selective regarding age, sex, 
education, and also religion (Ambrosini, Mayr, Peri, & Radu, 2012; Connor, 2012). We use findings 
from Pew Research Forum’s Faith on the Move Project (Pew 2012) to account for selection of 
migrants by religion when data are available. For origin countries where data on religion on 
migrants are not available assumption the migrant flow is representative of the religious 
composition of country of origin . Our indirect approach means we need to bear these limits in mind 
when interpreting the results. Information on religious compositions by country needed in our 
estimation was collected from Pew Forum’s Global Religious Landscape project (Pew, 2012), and 
the World Religion Database (Johnson & Grim, 2010). These sources estimate that Spain's 
population was 2.1% Muslim in 2010. The share of Other Christians was estimated to be about 
3.4%; According to Johnson and Ross (2009) there were 130,000 Evangelicals and 120,000 other 
Protestants in Spain in 2010. In recent years population of Orthodox Christians has grown rapidly 
because of inflow of migrants from Romania – the largest group of migrants in Spain in 2010 (0.76 
million; INE 2011)  
 To assess the degree of religiosity in the population, we categorize each religious 
denomination in two groups: High and Low Religiosity. The distinction between the two groups is 
                                                          
6
 Data from the Spanish Municipal Register (Padron) 2010 (INE,2011) 
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based on self-assessed religiosity estimated using data from European Social Surveys 2006-2010 
(ESS, 2012)(wave III to V) [11-scale question: Regardless of whether you belong to a particular 
religion, how religious would you say you are?, recoded as: 6-10 “High Religiosity”, 0-4 “Low 
Religiosity”] 7. To estimate the composition for Spain, it was not possible to use only the Spanish ESS 
data. Thus we pool data on Muslims from Spain, France, Netherlands, Belgium and Italy (countries 
with large Moroccan diaspora). Religiosity by age and sex of Others are assumed to be the same as 
in total population of Spain. 
 The age structure of the Spanish population, by sex and religion, is given in Figure 1. it 
reveals that older age groups are dominated by high religious Christians, while those with no 
religion have a younger age structure, and minority religions are younger still. The figure shows 
that the high religious tend to be older (regardless of denomination), that women are more 
religious than men, and that the youngest age groups are somewhat more religious – which follows 
the greater fertility of the more religious coupled with intergenerational transmission from parents 
to children. 
                                                          
7
 The current “6-10” group encompasses 39% of the population 15 and above in Spain , whereas a “5-10” 
grouping would include 57% of the population. Calculations were based on ESS (2012) 3-5 wave data (2006-
2010).  
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Figure 1. Population Age Structure, by Sex, Religious Denomination and Intensity in Spain in 20108 
 
Table 1. Religious and religious  intensity composition by age in Spain in 2010 [%] 
Age 
Christians Muslims Others 
Unaffiliated 
Total 
High Low High Low High Low  High Low 
15-34 27.0 38.3 2.9 0.9 0.2 0.1 30.6 30.2 39.3 
35-64 38.2 40.6 1.2 0.5 0.2 0.1 19.2 39.6 41.2 
65+ 66.2 28.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 5.4 66.4 28.1 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 labels used in graphs: Denomination-H stands for Denomination-High Religious; Denomination-L means 
Denomination-Low Religious;. 
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FERTILITY 
Estimates of fertility differentials are based on the 1999 Spanish Fertility Survey (INE, 
1999) and municipal registrations of births and population by nationality and age of mother9 (INE, 
2011). Fertility of Muslims is assumed to be equivalent to that of Moroccans, Algerians, and 
Pakistanis combined; together they constitute about 84% of the estimated Muslim population of 
Spain.  
 Differences in Spanish fertility by degree of religiosity are based on results of the average 
number of children ever born for females 40-49 from the European Social Survey Round 3 survey 
(ESS, 2012). This estimation was possible only for Christians (and for the overall population) 
because the sample size was too small for estimations for all other groups. To get a large enough 
sample to calculate intra-Muslim intensity differences, we use a sample including respondents from 
all nations participating in the survey (23 European countries). They constitute about 3% of the 
total ESS sample. For Others we assume (due to a lack of other data) that the differences in fertility 
between those with high and low religiosity are equal to that observed for the total population of 
Spain. The TFR estimates by religious intensity are provided in Table 2. The fertility of the high 
religiosity group is 2.0, the low religiosity 1.4, and for those with no religion, it stands at around 1 
child, which supports the notion that the more religious have more children, regardless of faith 
tradition.   
 
Table 2. Total Fertility Rate by level of religiosity in Spain in 2010-2015 
Religion Christians Muslims Others 
Unaffiliated 
Total Total 
Religiosity High Low High Low High Low  High Low Total 
TFR 1.9 1.3 4.2 3.1 1.8 1.3 1.0 2.0 1.4 1.5 
 
                                                          
9 INE data for the period 1996-2008 
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The high fertility of the Muslim population is partly likely to be due to the fact that most 
Muslims in Spain are recent migrants. Many come for marriage-related reasons, which lead to 
greater fertility in the shorter term after arrival. Further, many Muslims arrive from countries with 
relatively high fertility, although most originate from the Maghreb, where fertility is close to 
replacement level. Women in Morocco, for instance, bear 2.4 children on average. Over time, with a 
longer duration of stay and increased integration, the fertility of this group is likely to at least 
partially converge with the population average (which would be in line with empirical findings 
from Germany, the UK, and Canada: Caron Malenfant, Lebel, & Martel, 2010; Coleman & Dubuc, 
2010; Schmid & Kohls, 2009).  
 
 
 
RELIGIOUS SWITCHING 
Conversions between religious groups tend to be concentrated relatively early in life, at 
ages 15-29. Based on patterns in our survey data, backed by insights from previous work, we 
assume that religious intensity tends to change less at later ages. This assumption is supported by 
several theoretical and empirical studies, including longitudinal, retrospective, and age-period-
cohort analyses. In particular, conversion and secularization tend to take place in early adulthood in 
Europe. Beyond early adulthood, switching affiliation and varying one's level of religiosity is less 
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likely. Thus religious change may, to a significant degree, take place along cohort lines, with cohort 
replacement driving aggregate religious shifts.  
The likelihood that one changes one’s denomination may also depend on changes in brain 
functioning and hormone levels over the life cycle. Archer (2006) shows that as testosterone rises 
early in life, behavioural changes are facilitated - high testosterone levels may be a reason for 
fundamental social change and riskier attitudes and behavior. Impressions made early in life can 
have a stronger imprint on ones value understandings than later experiences (Rubin 1999). Over 
the life course, there are age expectations, informal sanctions, social timetables and generalized age 
grades (Ryder 1965, Settersten 1996). Norms and expectations can determine the timing and 
incidence of life cycle changes. The human capital model of life cycle change suggests that 
individuals alter their beliefs and religious views in a matching procedure which occurs early in life 
(Becker, 1981). As an individual matures, he or she increasingly invests in a particular religious 
community, hence, the cost of religious switching increases as the “capital” specific to that religious 
community grows. The upshot is that few middle-age adults and even fewer seniors convert 
(Iannaccone, 1992).  
 To generate assumptions about transition rates by religious intensity, we cross-tabulate 
data from ISSP 2008 Religion III survey on a respondent's retrospective attendance at age 11-1210 
with their current religious attendance11. We acknowledge that some studies find that recall bias 
may affect estimated attendance over the life cycle (Berney & Blane, 1997; Hays, Meador, Branch, & 
George, 2001; Ploch & Hastings, 1998). 
We use attendance at religious services at least once a month as the limiting condition for 
being highly religious, as using this value yields the highest degree of average religiosity on scale in 
                                                          
10
 Wording of the question: “And what about when you were around 11 or 12, how often did youattend religious 
services then?”  
11
 Wording of the question: ”How often do you go to mass or other religious services, excluding the occasions 
related to social ceremonies, such as weddings, first communions, or funerals?” 
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the ISSP 200812. Our estimates are given in Tables 3a and 3b, where transitions from and to 
religious intensity groups and apostasy rates for these groups are taken into account. Transitions 
for Others are not taken into account, as data are not available.  
 Results shown in Table 3a suggest that around 50-70% of Christian males changed their 
religion and degree of religiosity during their life. For example, among men raised in highly 
religious Catholic families, only 28% remain high religious, 51% experience lower religiosity but 
retain an affiliation, and 21% become unaffiliated. In the case of females in our sample, among 
those raised as high religious Catholics, 59% changed their religious status compared to 72% of 
men (Table 1b). This suggests that strongly Catholic women in Spain retain their religiosity at 
higher rates than men. However, females raised as low-intensity Catholics behave similar to males 
raised the same way.  
 
Table 3 a-b). Switching rates of religion and religiosity [in percentages] 
a) Males 
Religious group 
Current 
Christians Muslims Others 
Unaffiliated 
High Low High Low High Low  
Former 
Christians 
High 28 51 0 0 0 0 21 
Low 4 54 0 0 0 0 42 
Muslims 
High 0 0 43 39 0 0 18 
Low 0 0 16 43 0 0 41 
Others 
High 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 
Low  0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
Unaffiliated 0 27 0 0 0 0 70 
 
b) Females 
                                                          
12
 According to the ISSP 2008 among respondents who attend religious services at least once a month, around 
82% define theirself as “somewhat religious” or higher.  
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Religious group 
Current 
Christians Muslims Others 
Unaffiliated 
High Low High Low High Low  
Former 
Christians 
High 41 48 0 0 0 0 11 
Low 12 57 0 0 0 0 31 
Muslims 
High 0 0 37 47 0 0 16 
Low 0 0 12 54 0 0 35 
Others 
High 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 
Low  0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
Unaffiliated 0 34 0 0 0 0 66 
 
MIGRATION 
Migration data is provided by Table 4 , which shows the distribution of inflow and outflow 
by religion and religiosity. Estimating religion and religious intensity for immigrants is difficult due 
to data limitations. Baseline inflow and outflow of migrants for Spain are calculated based on 
estimates of international migration bilateral flows (Abel, 2013), and data on migrants by 
nationality and country of birth from Spanish national statistical office (INE). We combine this 
information with estimates of flow by religion from the Pew Research Forum’s Faith on the Move 
Project (Pew 2012). We collected information of self-assessed religiosity from several international 
surveys: ISSP, ESS, EVS and WVS, and use in estimation of religiosity of migrants in Spain. We are 
aware that there is a significant difference between questions on self-assessed religiosity in these 
data sources (used in estimation of baseline structure) but we lack comparable data at the world 
scale. Using our projection model of bilateral flows by age, sex and religion for 199 countries (…) we 
calculate size and composition of migrants to Spain in 2010-2060.  
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Table 4. Religious Affiliation and Religiosity Composition of migration flows in Spain 
Religion Christians Muslims Others 
Unaffiliated 
Total 
Religiosity High Low High Low High Low  High Low 
Out-migration 29.8 36.7 9.7 3.1 0.7 0.3 19.6 40.3 40.1 
In-migration 46.6 23.7 9.5 5.0 2.3 1.2 11.7 58.4 29.9 
 
  
Spain has experienced the change in migration pattern in 2000s . Until the year 2007 it was 
dominantly in-migration country with high and growing number of immigrants  that reached the 
peak of around 900 thousand people (2007) and low number of emigrants which was below 100 
thousand per year (e.g. Eurostat 2013). After that because of decrease of economic conditions in 
Spain the trend in immigration and emigration changed. We observe the change towards zero net 
migration with increasing trend of emigration and decreasing in immigration. According to 
Eurostat, in 2010 around 403 thousand people left Spain and 465 thousand come to this country. 
Thus, during five years net migration dropped from 731 thousand in 2007 to 62 thousand people in 
2011. Recent provisional data from INE suggest that net migration reached negative values in 2012. 
   
PROJECTION SCENARIOS 
To investigate the impact of fertility differentials and migration, we project five different scenarios.  
FgMcSn: Fertility differentials gradually converge; migration size and composition is stable; 
no switching  
FgMcSs: Fertility differentials gradually converge; migration size and composition is stable; 
switching rates are stable 
FsMzSn: Fertility differentials are stable; zero migration; switching rates are stable 
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FsMzSs: Fertility differentials are stable; migration is zero; switching rates are stable 
FgMzSs: Fertility differentials gradually converge; migration is zero for the whole 
projection period; switching rates are stable 
In the fertility convergence scenario (Fg), all religious faiths and those without religion are  
assumed to eventually experience the same fertility level (by 2060) – which implies for instance 
that those with no religion are expected to gradual increase their fertility. The Fs scenario considers 
what the situation would be if fertility would continue as it is today.  
We consider both continued migration and (Mc) and no migration (Mz) scenarios. The main 
hypothesis behind the five scenarios is that fertility differentials will be greater if high migration 
levels continue. 
Note that in this paper we focus on demographic change and assume a fixed pattern of 
switching identical to that obtaining in the mid-2000s (Ss). The current rate of switching out of 
religion in Spain is relatively high in historic terms and have substantial effects on the religious 
composition of the future. We also consider the case where no switching (Sn) takes place in order to 
be able to compare the effects of switching with the situation where no switching occurs.  
  
PROJECTION RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
The paper at hand presents what to our knowledge is the first projection of religiosity intensity in a 
population. This bears strongly on the critical question of the future of religiosity and secularization 
in Europe. It also informs the debate over religious restructuring, which claims that there is a 
growing polarization in which a decline of moderate religion is accompanied by the concomitant 
expansion of the "extremes" of strong religion and secularism. This can have important 
consequences on for instance politics, social norms, national identity and international relations 
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(Martin 2012; Roy 2010; Barkey 2011). We explore this question through the prism of the Spanish 
case, considering three religious intensity groups: "High," "Low" and "Non-religious"—and the 
religious affiliation categories of Christians and Muslims.  
 Spain has, in recent decades, simultaneously experienced rapid religious decline and 
marked demographic change. Fertility has declined sharply while immigration has surged. As a 
result, its religious-demographic composition is evolving quickly.  
 Our findings are presented in Figures 6 a-e. Displayed are the changes in the proportion of 
the Spanish population by religious groups (with intensities nested therein) over 2005-2050. One 
finding is that fertility differentials and more immigration produces  an increase in the share of the 
high religious in Spain. The more religious tend to have higher fertility, regardless of their 
affiliation, and immigrants tend be more religious than the indigenous population.   
 How is this likely to affect the composition of the Spanish population in the future? 
Although fertility differentials and immigration may raise the share of the more religious, there are 
important mechanisms which are likely to reduce religiosity in the population. Those without 
religion have a younger age structure, which implies that they will grow through cohort 
replacement even if religious apostasy were to cease tomorrow. The highly religious are older and 
will therefore decline in the coming decades as highly devout older cohorts die off. Furthermore, 
religious switching produces a substantial increase in religious "nones", as leaving religion is far 
more common than switching between religious groups or from no religion to a religious group.   
          If fertility differentials and migration levels continue at the level of the mid-2000s (FgMcSn) 
and there is no switching, the share of Christians with high religiosity will decline from 41,4% in 
2010 to 40,5% in 2025, but will then rise to 42,6% in 2050. The unaffiliated are projected to decline 
from 18,9% in 2010 to 17,3% by 2050 
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If switching continues there will be a decrease in the share of Christians with high religiosity 
(falling to 29,5% in 2050), but a growth among low religiosity Christians (from 37% in 2010 to 
39.5% in 2050). There is also likely to be an increase in share without religion (rising to 24,8% in 
2050). If fertility differentials should be constant and there would not be any migration but stable 
switching (FgMzSs) there would be an increase in the share of low religiosity Christians to 43.4% 
by 2050.  
We focus on Muslims, as it is the largest minority religion, and we find that in the shorter term, the 
gradual convergence in fertility, but constant migration and stable switching (FgMcSs) implies that 
the high religious Muslims will grow from 2,4% in 2010 to 5,2% in 2050. However, the scenario 
with stable fertility differences but zero migration (FsMzSs) implies an initial slower growth of the 
Muslims, but by 2050 this scenario predicts that they will reach 6%, reflecting that fertility 
differences has stronger implications for growth than conversion in the longer term. If fertility 
differentials would converge, there would be zero migration and stable switching (FgMzSs), the 
high religious Muslim population is projected to stabilize at a level of around 2,1% already by 2020 
and remain constant until 2050.  
An increase in the non-Christian share of the population, is, however, found in our scenarios where 
immigration and fertility differences (or one of the two) continue to take place. Migrants in Europe 
have in many cases shown relatively little tendency to become less religious. Ethnic minorities may 
use religion as a boundary marker, which reinforces religion. This reflects cultural defense theory 
in which ethnic difference offers religion "secular" work to do, thereby protecting it from decline in 
secularizing societies (Bruce, 2002; Martin, [1978] 1993). Moreover, a falling rate of religious 
decline among the native white Christian population as the core practicing population, increasingly 
identified as a remnant, is also reflected in some studies (Jenkins, 2007; Kaufmann, et al., 2011). In 
many Protestant European countries as well as in France religious decline began earlier than in 
most Catholic countries, and has largely flattened out. Spain, like Ireland, belongs to the wave of 
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late-declining Catholic countries which are still undergoing swift switching away from organized 
religion.  
Christians will remain in the majority over the projection period although their share is forecast to 
fall from 78,5% to 67,2%-75,9% depending on the scenario. Stable fertility differences, zero 
migration and no switching (FsMcSn) implies first a reduction in the share of high religious 
Christians, from 41% to 24,6%, while a growth in the low religious Christians from 37% to 42,7% 
by 2050.  
However, if migration should continue, the longer-term pattern could more closely conform to the 
polarization model, with religious "nones" growing, the highly religious stabilizing or increasing 
slightly, and those with low religiosity declining.  With a gradual convergence in fertility, constant 
migration and stable switching (FgMcSs) there will be a growth in both the high and low religious 
Christians and Muslims and Others and a slight reduction in the share who are unaffiliated.  
 The projections suggest a change in the religious landscape in Spain which accords with the 
religious restructuring paradigm. Seculars and the highly religious are increasing their market 
share, while moderates are declining. This has parallels in, for example, the United States, where 
evangelical Protestants and the religiously unaffiliated are growing relative to mainstream 
Protestants (Hout, Greeley, & Wilde, 2001; Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Skirbekk, et al., 2010). The 
projections also reveal that religious decline in Spain, despite its continued near-term increase, is 
likely to be slower in the future than in the decades since the fall of General Franco in 1975.  
Furthermore, the projected rebound of the highly religious population and the potential 
peaking of the secular population (under a constant fertility and migration scenario), imply that 
'desecularization' may begin to take place after 2050. This echoes similar work focusing on the 
United States, northwestern Europe, and Israel (Cincotta & Kaufmann, 2009; Kaufmann, 2010; 
Kaufmann, et al., 2011; Skirbekk, et al., 2010). This suggests that demography is a key factor 
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mediating change at the aggregate level, and that individual-level dynamics – whether of decline or 
revival – cannot be simply scaled up to the level of society. It further indicates that the trajectory of 
European modernity, to say nothing of modernity tout court, cannot be assumed to be one of 
inevitable secularization (Gray, 2003). 
 Our findings suggest that in the longer term (2050) there can be growth in the no-religion 
population, a decline among those with low religiosity, and stabilization or eventual growth among 
the highly religious. The growth of religious “nones”, a decline among those with low religiosity and 
an increase among the highly religious could, as noted, produce increasing religious polarization. 
Why? In part because those with low religiosity may function as “bridge-builders” between the non-
religious and the highly religious. In Britain, for instance, Anglican bishops, especially the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, play a public role in balancing the concerns of committed religious 
people with those of the nonreligious. The "theology-lite" offered by such figures presents a 
moderate face of religion to seculars and vice-versa, resulting in a relatively favorable view of 
religion among even the nonreligious (Bruce, 2002). A decrease in this segment may therefore 
portend increased social division. 
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 Figure 6 a-e) Projections of religions and religiosity by scenario 
a) Christians with high religiosity 
 
  
b) Christians with low religiosity 
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c) Muslims with high religiosity 
 
 
d) Muslims with low religiosity 
 27 
 
 
  
 28 
 
 
e) Unaffiliated 
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